Citizens' Autonomy and Corporate Cultural Power by Herzog, Lisa Maria
 
 
 University of Groningen
Citizens' Autonomy and Corporate Cultural Power
Herzog, Lisa Maria
Published in:
Journal of Social Philosophy
DOI:
10.1111/josp.12310
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Herzog, L. M. (2020). Citizens' Autonomy and Corporate Cultural Power. Journal of Social Philosophy,
51(2), 205-230. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12310
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 26-12-2020
Citizens’ Autonomy and Corporate Cultural Power
Lisa Herzog
1. Introduction
The citizens of a democracy cannot be indifferent to the conditions of the 
possibility of living a life that one can call one’s own—an autonomous life. If 
one accepts this premise, one has good reason to scrutinize the ways in which the 
minds of individuals are shaped by their work environment. In this paper, I intro-
duce the notion of “corporate cultural power” and evaluate it from a perspective 
of autonomy. Many contemporary societies are characterized by a combination 
of democracy and corporate capitalism.1  Most of their citizens depend on a labor 
income, a fact that raises numerous normative questions. One of them, which has 
received little attention so far, is how to safeguard citizens’ autonomy in the face 
of corporate cultural power.
Many industries put strong pressures on employees to “fit in.” As a former 
hedge fund manager put it in an interview: “Basically, the hedge fund world is 
very much like: this is how we are, and it’s almost old school, because this is 
how it has been for years. So, a new person coming in, trying to be different, 
is not going to work. If you don’t join the cult, you basically are left behind.”2  
What it means to “join the cult” varies from industry to industry and company 
to company; it can include, for example, a certain habitus and style of clothing, 
a notion of success, an understanding of how to treat individuals of different 
gender and different ethnicities, or an expectation to pursue certain hobbies or 
cultural interests. Spending eight or more hours working in a social environ-
ment in which such values, norms, and expectations are upheld, it is likely that 
individuals will, to some degree, be shaped by them. This is not the same as the 
déformation professionelle of the doctor who sees every individual as a patient, 
but rather a déformation corporatiste, stemming from the social environment 
within which one works.3 
Many corporations actively use and promote notions of “corporate culture,” 
“corporate identity,” or “corporate DNA” in order to shape the preferences and 
beliefs of their employees. To be sure, this may not always be successful, and 
where it is successful, it may be helped by processes of self-selection on the part 
of employees. Other corporations may not actively endorse a certain culture, and 
yet there may be strong pressures to adapt at least one’s outward behavior to 
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Social Philosophy published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
DOI: 10.1111/josp.12310
JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 51 No. 2, Summer 2020, 205–230.
bs_bs_banner
206  Lisa Herzog
the expectations of colleagues and managers. Friends and family may feel some 
unease when they see a person change in response to such pressures. But is there 
more to this phenomenon, from a normative perspective, than such unease? The 
answer I provide in this paper is that this is indeed the case, especially because 
many institutional safeguards that have, in the past, limited the influence of cor-
porate cultural power, are at risk of being eroded.
While much has been written about the power of corporations4  and about or-
ganizational culture, the connection between the two has rarely been explored.5  
Two strands of literature touch upon similar topics from a normative perspec-
tive. In a recent paper, Sandrine Blanc discusses the question of how individuals’ 
“moral space,” that is, “the set of situations and actions either open to or which in-
deed require moral judgment,”6  can be preserved in corporations. But we also need 
to ask whether and how corporations exert an influence on individuals, shaping 
their preferences and beliefs, a step that comes before questions about their “moral 
space” even arise. A second debate, which builds on empirical insights by Arlie 
Hochschild7  and others, concerns the ethical dimensions of companies attempting 
to influence the emotions of employees. As Ingrid Fulmer and Bruce Barry dis-
cuss, this topic can come up in “charismatic” leadership styles, which “implicitly 
or explicitly appeal to the emotions of organizational followers” rather than their 
capacity for reflection,8  or in issues concerning emotional labor, for example, in 
nursing, for which ethical constraints might be needed. Corporate cultural power is 
both more widespread and more elusive than these specific phenomena.
Neither has the role of corporate cultural power been discussed in political 
philosophy, despite a growing interest in corporations.9  The Rawlsian approach, 
with its emphasis on the “basic structure,” had long overshadowed interest in 
“meso-level” institutions and had focused attention on formal structures, rather 
than on seemingly “soft” factors such as social norms and cultural influences. In 
recent years, however, this has started to change: there is now more interest in 
normative questions “below the state,” in Chiara Cordelli’s words.10  In addition 
to corporations, institutions such as civil society organizations or religious orga-
nizations are now considered from normative perspectives, whether of justice or 
of democracy.11  This paper contributes to this literature: by considering the threat 
that corporate cultural power can pose to citizens’ autonomy, it draws out impli-
cations not only for corporate governance, but also for the broader institutional 
framework within which corporations are embedded, that is, implications that fall 
into the realms of both business ethics and political philosophy.12  As I hope to 
make clear, taking corporate cultural power into account sheds new light onto a 
number of debates in political philosophy.
I will explore the normative dimensions of corporate power on the basis of 
what may appear to be a weak normative premise: all citizens should live under 
conditions in which they have a reasonable chance to lead an autonomous life. 
This may not be the only normative dimension of corporate cultural power, but it 
is a central one. My discussion is “non-ideal” in the sense that I do not question 
the legitimacy of large-scale workplaces as such, and remain agnostic with regard 
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to the question of whether or not such organizations would be part of an ideally 
just society. But my account is nonetheless reformist: I argue that corporate cul-
tural power should be curtailed in order to preserve the conditions for individual 
autonomy.
In the next section, I briefly explain the notion of autonomy on which my 
argument is based, followed by a short discussion of the relation between social 
and cultural influences and autonomy on a general level, and a defense against 
the charge of perfectionism. I then explore the phenomenon of corporate cultural 
power in more detail, drawing on empirical literature and responding to some 
objections. I argue that corporations have a moral responsibility to use their cul-
tural power in ways that do not undermine individuals’ autonomy. There are good 
reasons for putting in place safeguards against too large an influence of corporate 
cultural power, which I discuss by drawing some connections to recent propos-
als in political philosophy. I conclude by pointing out how the argument I have 
developed could be taken further, to cover not only the cultural power of corpora-
tions over employees, on which I here focus, but also the impact of corporations 
on the broader culture.
2. Autonomy and Its Social and Cultural Conditions
In this section, I argue for two claims: first, to understand the preconditions 
of autonomy, we need to take the cultural context into account; second, a com-
mitment to autonomy, including attention to its cultural preconditions, is not per-
fectionist in a problematic sense, and traditional arguments against government 
involvement in the area of “culture” can be answered.
Autonomy, or “governing oneself,” can be understood, in a modest sense, as 
a precondition for a life that can be called one’s own. Many authors distinguish 
between the “competence condition” and the “authenticity condition” of auton-
omy.13  The first describes the ability to govern one’s own life, for example, to 
follow through with one’s plans. The second describes the fact that one’s pref-
erences are one’s own ones, rather than ones that one has uncritically taken over 
from others.
Neither condition requires thinking about individuals as detached from social 
contexts. This conception of autonomy is compatible with holding that the human 
self is “largely a product of social factors.”14  In fact, it is unlikely that individuals 
can develop and maintain sufficient levels of autonomy without support from their 
environment. As Jennifer Nedelsky, for example, emphasizes, autonomy should 
not be understood as independence, but rather as a relational concept: it is made 
possible by suitable social relations that provide the “capacity for creative inter-
action,” allowing individuals to “find their own law.”15  Thus, instead of thinking 
about autonomy as a feature of atomistic individuals, Nedelsky and others have 
pointed out that we need a concept of autonomy that takes the necessity of auton-
omy-enhancing social relations seriously.
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Obviously, the formative periods of childhood and youth, and the social rela-
tions with parents, teachers, and other caretakers, play a crucial role for develop-
ing autonomy. But the conditions for autonomy need to be in place for individuals 
during their whole lives, otherwise their ability to lead a life in which they govern 
themselves may be at risk later on. One can distinguish, here, between two cate-
gories of social relations: those that actively support individuals’ autonomy, and 
those that might not support it, but at least do not undermine it. In what follows, I 
assume that the former have their primary space in the private realm: in intimate 
relations within families, partnerships, and friendships; of course the broader so-
cietal structures and culture also need to be such that autonomy-enhancing social 
relations of this kind are possible. For the world of work, in contrast, on which I 
here focus, a minimum condition is that social relations should be such that au-
tonomy is not threatened.16 
Two conditions for developing and maintaining autonomy are particularly rel-
evant for the purpose of thinking about threats to autonomy in the workplace; they 
are minimum conditions on which theorists of autonomy on a broad spectrum, 
from John Stuart Mill to Nedelsky, could probably agree. The first is the ability 
to hear a plurality of voices and positions, rather than being exposed to one single 
system of values. It is often through comparison and confrontation with alterna-
tives that one comes to see the strengths and weaknesses of values and arguments, 
and it is through critical reflection on counterarguments or different paradigms that 
one comes to endorse, refine or reject them.17  This is one of the reasons why it is 
wrong for states to force citizens to adopt one and only one worldview: not only 
does this directly violate their freedoms, it also undermines the conditions of the 
possibility of autonomy, because they do not have a chance to think critically about 
alternatives and to develop beliefs and preferences that are truly their own.
The second condition is the ability to step back from one’s daily activities 
and to think about who one is and what values one endorses. Hannah Arendt has 
called this kind of reflection “Socratic” thinking: an inner dialogue with “this 
silent partner I carry with myself.”18  It requires interrupting the “restless activity” 
of one’s days, during which it is almost impossible to think critically about what 
one is doing.19  Such inner dialogue helps individuals to find out who they are: 
what their beliefs, preferences, and commitments are. To be sure, it is not only in 
inner dialogue that they do so: dialogue with others can also play a crucial role. It 
needs to be a dialogue, though, that is sufficiently free from social pressures and 
strategic considerations, otherwise it is unlikely that individuals can “open up” to 
the point of challenging their fundamental commitments. Such dialogue can cer-
tainly take in many social contexts, including the workplace, but it has its prime 
place in people’s private lives (and maybe in political life), not in the hectic world 
of work with its numerous pressures and dependencies.
Theorists who care about the autonomy of citizens thus have reasons to care 
about the institutional framework of society, and to ask whether it is supportive of 
autonomy. For example, this framework needs to ensure that all members of soci-
ety have sufficient free time for reflection and for maintaining the kinds of social 
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relations that nurture their autonomy. Insofar as these theorists are liberals, they 
would certainly want the institutional framework to provide space for a plurality 
of nonstate agents, for example, cultural institutions, to play a role in creating the 
conditions for developing and maintaining autonomy. Insofar as they are egalitar-
ians, they care about the conditions of the possibility of an autonomous life being 
in place not only for the privileged, but for everyone.
However, one should consider not only formal institutions, in the sense of 
coercive governmental institutions, when thinking about citizens’ autonomy, but 
also the broader culture of a society. A society’s culture, in this context, can be 
understood as a complex, interrelated combination of cultural influences from 
various sources.20  Given what we know about human psychology from history, 
ethnography, and experimental studies, we must assume that culture has a large 
impact on human beings. Man is a social animal, and adaptation to the culture one 
finds oneself in can be an almost instinctual reaction.21  The desire for social rec-
ognition is a powerful motivator, and the sense that “this is what everyone does” 
often guides individuals’ decisions and actions.
A society’s culture can emphasize “thinking for oneself” and value the plu-
rality and diversity that comes from people choosing from a broad variety of 
worldviews and ways of life—or it can frown upon individual choice and em-
phasize the importance of established role models and traditions, thus working 
against the desire for autonomy. For citizens’ autonomy to be supported, the for-
mer is obviously more helpful than the latter. Again, from a liberal egalitarian 
perspective, both freedom and equality matter in this respect. The state should 
protect the freedom of all individuals to participate in processes of creating and 
changing the society’s culture. The egalitarian component is that these cultural 
conditions should be provided for everyone, not just for those in privileged posi-
tions or who are part of a powerful mainstream culture. This is why a state might 
also take some steps to protect and support cultural projects by minorities that 
would otherwise be crowded out by the mainstream culture.
The second claim I want to defend is that this understanding of autonomy and 
its cultural preconditions is not perfectionist, and does not lead to a problematic 
picture of the state’s role. A critic might object to the proposed understanding 
of autonomy, and to the argument that its cultural preconditions deserve to be 
taken seriously, by claiming that this is a perfectionist ideal that is not shared by 
everyone, and that the state must not promote it, but should rather stay neutral. 
But this criticism is misplaced, because the point of my argument is not to push or 
entice individuals to achieve the highest possible degree of autonomy. Rather, the 
point is to put them into a position in which they can make a meaningful choice 
about whichever way of life they want to pursue.22  As such, it does not violate the 
imperative of neutrality.
Nonetheless, the idea that a liberal state should somehow care about cul-
ture—rather than focus exclusively on the formal institutional framework—can 
raise legitimate worries. My point, however, is not that the state should try to 
directly “install” or “create” a certain kind of culture. Rather, it should create a 
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framework in which an autonomy-friendly culture can flourish. Where it might 
be justified in taking a more active stance, in contrast, are cultural tendencies that 
might harm individuals’ autonomy. Such cases are often related to imbalances of 
power, for example, when a cultural majority puts pressure on cultural minorities. 
In such situations, it is unlikely that improvements of the cultural climate will 
come about just by themselves, in some kind of organic process, because the 
power differentials reinforce, and are in turn reinforced by, the cultural influence 
of the more powerful party. Thus, the impetus to address such situations—not 
necessarily by direct interventions, but maybe by changes in the broader frame-
work—stems from egalitarian as much as from autonomy-related concerns.
To be sure, when doing so, one needs to take into account whether the pro-
posed cure might be worse than the disease, that is, whether other limitations of 
autonomy would be required. Arguably, however, there is a spectrum of possi-
bilities of what governments can do that would not reduce autonomy in different 
places, for example by providing information or reining in the influence of pow-
erful actors.23 
In order to clarify the picture I have in mind, it is helpful to draw a parallel 
to a similar question, famously posed by Ronald Dworkin, namely “Can a Liberal 
State Support Art?”24  His answer is a cautious “yes,” arguing that the “structural 
aspects” of a society’s culture are “themselves worthy of attention,” and that a 
case can be made for “defin[ing] a rich cultural structure, one that multiplies 
distinct possibilities or opportunities of value, and count[ing] ourselves trustees 
for protecting the richness of our culture for those who will live their lives in it 
after us.”25  This does not imply that the state should itself create cultural goods, 
but rather that it should create opportunities for citizens to do so. In analogy, I 
propose that a state can and should take care of the framework of society with an 
eye to the cultures that can flourish in it or that are suppressed—not because any 
of these cultures should be considered as, by itself, more valuable than others, but 
because some cultural tendencies might pose risks for the autonomy of individu-
als and make it very difficult for them to develop and maintain their autonomy.26 
In fact, many theoretical approaches seem to simply presuppose that the con-
ditions for developing and maintaining autonomy are fulfilled. For example, many 
democratic theories assume that individuals can develop political preferences that 
they express through their votes. If their political preferences were shaped by others, 
for example, family clans or the corporations they work for, the idea of democratic 
government as “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” in Abraham 
Lincoln’s famous words, crumbles: it is then these entities, rather than “the people,” 
who govern. Or take theories of distributive justice: it is standardly assumed that in-
dividuals can use their resources according to their own preferences, rather than using 
them for supporting families or religious groups whose orders they follow blindly.
Thus, autonomy, understood in this minimal sense, is a normative ideal that 
is widely shared by thinkers across the political and ideological spectrum. To be 
sure, commentators may disagree about the precise boundaries of autonomy, and 
they may also disagree on what is required in order to create the conditions of the 
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possibility of autonomy (a judgment that is likely to be influenced by empirical 
assumptions as much as normative commitments). But they can nonetheless agree 
that certain phenomena present threats to autonomy, and that such threats should 
be mitigated, usually by changing the formal framework of institutions such that 
cultural threads to autonomy are prevented and autonomy-friendly cultures can 
flourish. These are the assumptions on which the following reflections about cor-
porate cultural power are based.
3. Corporate Culture, Corporate Power
In this section, I describe the phenomenon of corporate cultural power in 
more detail, in order to see in what ways it might be a threat to individuals’ au-
tonomy. As a first approximation, we can describe corporate cultural power as 
the power corporations have because they set the defaults of what individuals 
do, thereby creating a certain corporate culture. It can be based on formal or in-
formal norms. Employees often reinforce the corporate culture by unconsciously 
following these norms, thereby making deviations more difficult for others. The 
phenomenon of corporate or organizational culture is widely acknowledged in 
the empirical literature. Terrence E. Deal and Allen A. Kennedy, in their influen-
tial book Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life, draw on 
Marvin Bower for a very simple definition: they understand culture as “the way 
we do things around here.”27  A more sophisticated account, by Edgar Schein, 
defines it as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as 
it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those prob-
lems.”28  Schein distinguishes three layers of culture: artifacts, espoused values, 
and beliefs and underlying basic assumptions. Philosophers interested in corpo-
rate culture understand it in similar ways: Edwin Hartman describes it as “the 
body of shared beliefs, values, expectations, and norms of behavior that shape life 
in the organization and account for certain observable artifacts,”29  and Seumas 
Miller describes it as comprising “the informal attitudes, values, norms, and ethos 
or “spirit” that pervades an institution.”30 
What is less discussed, however, is how corporate culture can be understood 
as a form of power over employees. This may have to do with the fact that the 
notion of power is itself contested; we can, however, draw on some conceptual-
izations that emphasize nonmaterial aspects related to cultural phenomena. Thus, 
in an influential account, Stephen Lukes has distinguished three “faces” of power: 
decision-making power, the power not to make decisions, and ideological power.31  
Whereas the first is publicly visible, the two others operate less openly and are hence 
more difficult to analyze. The power not to make decisions is the power to take 
certain items off the agenda. Ideological power concerns power over beliefs and 
preferences. For my notion of cultural power, the second and the third dimension 
are obviously of great importance. David Hiley, who distinguishes “behavioral,” 
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“ideological,” and “disciplinary” dimensions of power in organizations, notes that 
ideological power works “through the way a belief system or set of values figures 
in structuring or fostering the conditions for certain explicit outcomes.”32 
A helpful concept is Karl Weick’s notion of “sensemaking,” which describes 
how individuals jointly describe, interpret, and make sense of the social reality 
around them.33  This process is dynamic, social, and interactive, and it can have 
performative effects. However, not all individuals play an equal role in it; those 
who are in management positions, for example, are likely to have a greater im-
pact.34  Tim Hallett, who conceptualizes organizational culture as a “negotiated 
order,” draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of “habitus” and “symbolic power” to 
describe how some individuals have “the power to define the situation.”35  These 
various accounts of organizational culture all agree that it includes defaults and 
the interpretation of situations and events, and that it often goes unnoticed. As 
Hallett notes, for example: “Oftentimes … people do not realize they are imbu-
ing a negotiator with legitimacy and symbolic power.”36  Nonetheless, this form 
power can be very effective, because it includes the giving and taking of legiti-
macy and the definition of what individuals will see as normal.
Based on these theoretical accounts, we can provide the following definition 
of corporate cultural power:
The power exercised by a corporation by defining the routines, descriptions and interpre-
tations of how and why things are done, thereby making sense of the social reality and 
creating defaults with regard to beliefs and values that individuals may not be fully aware 
of and that are hard to challenge.37 
This notion is, admittedly, fuzzy around the edges, but this seems unavoidable 
given that the social reality to which it refers is equally fuzzy and complex. 
There is also an inevitably subjective element in how individuals perceive it. 
Nonetheless, it seems hard to deny the existence and the impact of this form of 
power. The questions implicitly answered by the cultural power of organizations 
can concern tasks within the organization—for example, how much time should 
one spend working? What counts as a successful project? What counts as being 
a good colleague? What behavior between individuals of different gender is seen 
as appropriate within the corporation?—but also broader questions—for example, 
what counts as a successful life, and what role does work have in it? What counts 
as being a good friend? What gender roles are “normal”?
Corporate cultural power can be exercised intentionally or unintentionally. 
Hallett, for example, draws on Erving Goffman’s distinction between “signals 
given” in a conscious, intentional way, and “signals given off” in an unconscious, 
unintended way.38  Even—or especially!—when “given off,” the signals sent by a 
senior manager can have a strong impact on the corporate culture. For example, 
by “giving away” that she does not take certain pieces of government regulation 
seriously, a manager may reinforce a culture in which employees work around, 
rather than within, the regulatory framework. Corporations and their management 
cannot avoid sending signals, nor can they avoid setting defaults. New members 
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are socialized into the community of those who accept these defaults, contribut-
ing to their social reinforcement.39  Thus, corporations can, arguably, not avoid 
exercising some degree of cultural power.
Often, however, corporate cultural power is used intentionally. Some man-
agement scholars emphatically recommend doing so. Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman’s management classic In Search of Excellence strongly emphasizes the 
role of values.40  They argue that “excellent companies” have “developed cultures 
that have incorporated the values and practices of the great leaders and thus those 
shared values can be seen to survive for decades after the passing of the original 
guru.”41  This is remarkably strong language, and Peters and Waterman are aware 
of it: they briefly discuss the question of whether such cultures could also be put to 
sinister uses.42  But they nonetheless insist on the importance of culture and the le-
gitimacy of using it. Terry Deal and Allen Kennedy have brought the topic into the 
mainstream of management scholarship, both descriptively and prescriptively.43 
Why are managers and management scholars so interested in cultural power? 
Cultural power can complement, and sometimes replace, other forms of con-
trol. As Peters and Waterman note, “the stronger the culture and the more it was 
directed toward the marketplace, the less need was there for policy manuals, 
organization charts, or detailed procedures and rules.”44  If employees share a 
corporation’s values, they need to be offered fewer material incentives. In this 
book, and also in many other pieces in management scholarship, the importance 
of culture is taken as given. As Deal and Kennedy write about early American 
business leaders: “They believed that the lives and productivity of their employ-
ees were shaped by where they worked.”45  Shared values can act “as an informal 
control system that tells people what is expected of them,”46  because “the power 
of values is that people care about them.”47  “Rites and Rituals” matter, because, 
as Napoleon said, “You lead men by baubles, not words.”48 
As William Ouchi argues, from a transaction cost perspective it can be 
highly advantageous for corporations to rely not only on “hierarchies,” but to 
form “clans” of employees who share certain values.49  This is particularly rele-
vant when tasks are complex, highly interactive, or otherwise hard to measure, so 
that the value added by each individual is hard to evaluate. This is often the case 
in “technologically advanced or closely integrated industries, where teamwork 
is common, technologies change often, and therefore individual performance is 
highly ambiguous.”50  With more and more of purely “bureaucratic” tasks being 
delegated to computer programs and robots, we can expect that more and more 
industries in which human individuals work will take on the character of “clans.”
In order to really appreciate the impact of corporate cultural power, it is 
important to remember that in capitalist societies there is usually an imbalance 
of power between employers and employees. Because most citizens are not in-
dependently rich, employers have leverage over them: employees agree to obey 
orders in return for receiving an income. Even if individuals have exit options, 
these usually consist in finding a job in a different corporation, rather than being 
self-employed. Hence, many individuals cannot escape the sphere of influence 
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of corporations.51  This is a crucial difference between the workplace and other 
spaces in which different forms of cultural power might be exercised over indi-
viduals, for example, religious organizations or sports clubs. Individuals can leave 
the latter without losing their income, which means that one can usually assume 
that their membership is voluntary. Hence, worries about autonomy only arise in 
rare cases, for example, when children are brought up within close-knit religious 
groups without any opportunity for getting to know outside perspectives.
Corporate cultural power, in contrast, works within this context of a general 
asymmetry of power between employers and employees, and it is intertwined 
with formal power and formal rules. In turn, it influences how formal power and 
formal rules are interpreted and applied. For example, the cultural context de-
fines which rules are seen as “bureaucratic nonsense” and which ones are seen as 
“important safety regulations.” Cultural power can also be intertwined with disci-
plinary power in a Foucaultian sense, which works through architectural displays 
and bodily discipline.52  It can be connected to various other forms of pressure, 
for example, pressures to contribute financially to the political agenda of one’s 
employer.53 
The central focus of corporate cultural power is thus things that happen within 
companies. But it is likely that corporate cultural power is not limited to the inside 
of corporations. If it shapes individuals’ beliefs and preferences, it can spill over 
into their private lives as well, and hence have a broader impact on society. For 
example, if employees get used to thinking about projects in terms of costs and 
benefits, this may also influence how they approach their private lives. This influ-
ence, via the influence on employees, is different from the influence corporations 
might have on the broader culture through advertisement. Some corporations, 
however, try to create a coherent “corporate identity” or “corporate DNA” that 
they use both vis-à-vis employees and vis-à-vis customers and the broader public.
Before considering corporate cultural power from the perspective of auton-
omy, two general objections need to be answered. The first is that I have vastly 
exaggerated the effects of corporate cultural power. Corporate cultural power, it 
might be said, is a surface phenomenon, a gloss put on the actual relations of fi-
nancial and coercive power. Individuals can look through the disguise, and insofar 
as they play along, pretending to endorse certain values, they do so for strategic 
reasons, not because they are really influenced by corporate cultural power.
One should grant to this critic that not every individual is equally susceptible 
to the influence of corporate cultural power. Some individuals are able to keep a 
clear mind and firm convictions even in the most unlikely circumstances. They 
might react to corporate cultural power with various forms of indifference and 
disengagement. But this is likely to require considerable mental and psycholog-
ical energy. In an ethnographic study on “engineering culture,” Gideon Kunda 
describes how individuals deal with the company culture that their employer tries 
to impose on them. He distinguishes mechanisms of denial (suggesting that it is 
“only a job”), depersonalization (separation of one’s private self from one’s com-
pany self), and dramatization (conscious role playing precisely in order to show 
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one’s distance from the role).54  His research shows that individuals genuinely 
struggle with these issues, and often fail to remain unaffected. Kunda calls this the 
“culture trap”: people are half coerced and half seduced to become uncritical of 
the company’s aims.55  Given this empirical evidence, the burden of proofs there-
fore lies with those who claim that corporate culture does not affect individuals.
A second objection consists in the claim that while corporate cultural power 
has an impact on individuals, it is impossible to predict, let alone manage, its ef-
fects—and, relatedly, that one cannot say that it is management that has such an 
impact on corporate culture. It would be a mistake, this critic holds, to think that 
one can move the levers of culture as if they were the levers of a Newtonian me-
chanical device. In addition to the “official” cultural power of the company, there 
is the informal cultural power that arises “bottom up” from employees, which in-
cludes the possibility of countercultures that openly mock the official slogans and 
resist attempts to change people’s minds. The idea that one might be able to in-
fluence corporate cultural power in ways that allow for active management from 
above is therefore fundamentally misguided. But if one cannot control corporate 
cultural power, how could it be made an issue of normative concern? Wouldn’t 
this rather be like attempting to make normative demands on the weather?56 
It is, admittedly, important to emphasize the elusive character of corporate 
cultural power. One should not see the phenomenon in a mechanistic way, and 
one should acknowledge that it is highly context-dependent. One can also agree 
that attempts to “micro-manage” corporate culture might backfire. But the fact 
that corporate cultural power, like all cultural phenomena, is variable and difficult 
to grasp does not mean that its effects are negligible. In cases in which managers 
actively draw on cultural values, they seem to be confident that they are able to do 
so, and one can hence hold them accountable for what they do.
There are in fact some reasons to think that managers have some possibilities 
of influencing corporate culture. For one thing, they are responsible for hiring 
processes, either directly or indirectly, by handing down the criteria for hiring. By 
selecting future members, managers have a say over the culture that will likely de-
velop between them. Moreover, organizational scholars often emphasize the im-
portance of setting “the tone from the top”: senior management needs to be firm 
on certain issues, for example, nondiscrimination and the rejection of corruption, 
for them to have a chance to be embodied in the general culture of an organiza-
tion. One reason for that is that while the actions and attitudes of many organiza-
tional members are visible only to their direct colleagues, the actions and attitudes 
of top managers are visible to all. With social media, this might in fact change, 
giving charismatic individuals from anywhere in the organization the possibility 
of becoming visible and hence having an impact on the corporate culture.
Thus, while one can acknowledge that corporate culture may be difficult to 
change just by fiat, this does not mean that there are no actions or behaviors—
whether by managers or by others who can influence corporate culture57 —that 
can have an impact on it that is predictable with reasonable certainty. For ex-
ample, if a senior manager—or an employee who has many followers on the 
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company’s online network—makes sexist jokes, this is likely to have an impact 
on the corporate culture as a whole, not least because others will feel licensed to 
make sexist jokes as well. Therefore, if the case can be made that corporate cul-
tural power poses a threat to autonomy, we have good reasons to ask what can be 
done about it, even if we have to be cautious about simplistic recipes.
4. The Specific Challenges of Corporate Cultural Power for Autonomy
In this section, I provide some reflections on why corporate cultural power 
poses a threat to citizens’ autonomy that is sufficiently severe to justify the crea-
tion of institutional safeguards against it;58  later, I will briefly discuss the pos-
sibility of an autonomy-enhancing corporate culture. The scenario of a threat is 
particularly relevant in situations in which individuals strongly depend on their 
jobs and have few exit options, which means that they have no realistic alterna-
tive to staying in their current job and “playing along.” If one knows that one has 
exit options, even if one does not use them, this supports autonomous reflection, 
because it is worth asking “Do I want to play along or not?” If one has no exit 
options, or if the alternatives are likely to be the same stuff in a different (corpo-
rate) color, asking such questions and reflecting on them may appear to be a futile 
exercise. It is hence tempting to let oneself be engulfed by the corporate culture 
and the values and principles espoused in it.
It might be objected that such a situation is normatively problematic for a 
number of reasons—lack of freedom, dependence, the danger that power will be 
abused, and so on—and should therefore never be part of a just society anyway. 
This may well be true, but corporate cultural power is likely to have an effect 
on individuals’ autonomy long before one arrives at the extreme lack of alter-
natives just described. Continued exposure to certain routines, descriptions and 
interpretations of the social world is likely to leave a mark on one’s own beliefs 
and values, even if one could, in theory, exit an employment relation. Rather than 
idealizing the ability to resist such influences, it is worth taking the “culture trap” 
described in Kunda’s ethnographic work seriously.
Two aspects of corporate cultural power are particularly relevant for consid-
ering its potentially negative impact on individuals’ autonomy: routinization and 
implicitness. Routines can make one stop questioning one’s behavior, leading to 
habitual compliance in which one does not pay attention to the details of what 
one does. We may hardly notice small shifts in the moral quality of what we do, 
even if, over time, these can add up to dramatic changes—this is the psychology 
of “slippery slopes.” It is one reason for why organizations can get individuals to 
contribute to actions they would strong condemn when considered in the abstract. 
As Maury Silver and Daniel Geller laconically put it: organizations can “routin-
ize everything, including murder.”59  But one does not have to draw on such dras-
tic cases; even if an action may not be morally problematic, individuals may not 
be autonomous in engaging in it, because they have been subject to corporate 
cultural power rather than having freely endorsed it. Corporate cultural power 
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works through habitualization and routinization, by making things appear normal. 
It silences the question of what each individual would actually see as justifiable 
when judging for himself or herself.
What contributes to this problem, and what is maybe the key distinction be-
tween cultural power and other forms of power exercised by corporations, is that 
it often functions implicitly: it is not made an issue, but rather works through what 
is taken for granted. Whereas explicit rules and regulations often contain a ratio-
nale for why things are to be done in a certain way, and the power exercised by 
managers through rewards and punishments is clearly visible, cultural power usu-
ally remains invisible. Often, individuals cannot directly challenge the premises 
that are taken for granted at their workplace. Without an opportunity for doing 
so, it can be difficult to see whether or not one can agree with the assumptions, 
norms, and values embedded in the corporate culture. It can take individuals quite 
some time to understand how the culture of their corporation functions, what 
values it transports, and what they themselves think about them—and by the time 
they have figured it out, they may already have been influenced, to some degree, 
by this very culture.
It is likely that processes of cognitive dissonance will occur: if individuals 
become suspicious that there might be a tension between their own values and the 
corporate culture, while at the same time feeling dependent on their job, they will 
probably come up with explanations that ease this tension. Psychologists have 
explored the various ways in which individuals can hold up a positive self-image 
even if they participate in atrocities, for example, by “advantageous comparisons” 
or “euphemistic labelling.”60  In many cases, collective action problems are proba-
bly part of the story: if all individuals resisted the effects of corporate culture, for 
example by making certain premises of their work an explicit issue of discussion, 
it would not be very difficult for others to question them critically as well. But 
if most or all individuals let themselves be carried away by the culture, it is very 
hard for single individuals to withstand it.
It might be asked, however, how this kind of cultural influence is different 
from other cultural influences to which individuals are exposed.61  To be sure, 
individuals are not exposed to corporate cultural power—at least not directly, as 
employee—during the formative years of childhood and youth. But once they 
arrive at working age, their workplace is the social sphere, apart from their family, 
in which they are most immersed, in terms of the sheer amount of hours spent 
there. Moreover, as described above, they are usually more dependent on their 
employers than on any other organization, because they receive an income from 
them. This power differential is experienced in a very direct way: managers, with 
whom employees interact every day, can refuse them a promotion or even fire 
them if they do not obey their orders. While one occasionally runs into similarly 
direct encounters with the power of the state, for example, when being controlled 
by a police patrol, this is not an everyday experience.
Another difference lies in the ways in which cultural power is used. Many 
corporations use cultural power in order to boost their economic performance, not 
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because they are genuinely interested in the values and beliefs that are part of their 
corporate culture. This can introduce a tension—a form of intrinsic dishonesty, as 
it were—into the very notion of corporate culture, especially when it is used to re-
place other forms of power, which may be less pleasant to experience, but which 
are at least honest in the sense that the individuals controlled by them understand 
exactly what is going on. Moreover, when individuals turn to corporations, they 
usually do not seek meaning and guidance—they seek an income, and they may 
also seek other goods of work, such as the development of skills or community 
with colleagues.62  But it is not at all clear that they want to be put under the influ-
ence of cultural power; some may indeed search for such workplaces, but others 
not, and in any case, the decision should be an autonomous one.
Here, it might be objected that business owners and workers should be free—
autonomous!—to create the kind of workplace culture they like. Individuals’ 
preference about corporate cultures is likely to differ: some want an intense, 
“cosy” relationship with their colleagues, while others are fine with more distant, 
“efficient” practices, and so on. This objection should be granted, but only up to 
a point: if individuals had preferences for creating cultures that undermine the 
autonomy of other members of an organization, this is problematic.63  Note, how-
ever, that in many case, it is simply not true that “business owners and workers” 
create the corporate culture together, on eye level. Rather, it is usually imposed 
one-sidedly, without any voice for workers—a point to which I come back below.
5. A Responsible Use of Corporate Cultural Power?
If these characterizations of corporate cultural power and its risks for auton-
omy are roughly correct, one might think that there is a straightforward solution: 
corporations, or those within them that have this power, should use it responsibly, 
in an autonomy-friendly way. As I have emphasized earlier, autonomy requires 
the right social and cultural conditions to flourish, and so it seems a reasonable 
suggestion to say that these conditions should be created in the workplace as well. 
For example, corporations might want to take steps to fight against sexist and rac-
ist prejudices, for example, by providing material that explains the mechanisms 
of implicit bias and by sending strong signals against any form of discrimination.
Such a responsibility seems particularly urgent when corporations con-
sciously and intentionally try to create a certain corporate culture: they have no 
moral right to do so in ways that would undermine their employees’ autonomy. 
But even in cases in which they simply let certain cultural developments happen, 
they might be culpable of negligence, for example, if they tolerate sexist or racist 
remarks. It should also be noted that in cases in which cultural power is exercised 
also by individuals “from below,” for example, charismatic team members, the 
same imperative holds for them.64 
Nonetheless, there remains a problem with such measures, which can be seen 
by comparing such steps taken by corporations or by governments. Governments 
can be held democratically accountable, and there are many possibilities of 
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discussing their policies in public discourse. Unless there is workplace democ-
racy—more on this below—this is not the case within corporations. As empha-
sized above, the rationale for establishing a certain culture is, in most cases, a 
purely instrumental one, with an eye to the “bottom line,” and it happens in a 
“top down” way. There is thus a danger that corporate engagement remains at 
the surface, where it does not cost much money, without really endorsing auton-
omy-enhancing values. For example, it is easy to put up posters that encourage 
employees to “think for themselves”; it is more difficult and costly to ensure that 
no employee is so overburdened in his or her position that there is no chance to sit 
down, reflect, and discuss critical issues with colleagues.
To be sure, there are cases in which corporations do hold autonomy-friendly 
values. Some companies, for example, those with explicit social purposes, are 
honestly committed to fostering their employees’ autonomy, even if this may 
mean lower profits. Nonetheless, such cases are normatively ambiguous in the 
sense that this enhancement of autonomy comes from a source that is ultimately 
problematic—an ambiguity that needs to be openly acknowledged. A good test 
question for the commitment of a company to fostering their employees’ auton-
omy is therefore: would they acknowledge that their own power is problematic, 
and would they welcome steps taken by the government or by other actors that 
further help to strengthen citizens’ autonomy? In the next section I turn to such 
other measures.
6. Limiting Corporate Cultural Power
What steps could one take for reducing the potentially negative influence of 
corporate cultural power on citizens’ autonomy? One challenge here, discussed 
in response to the second objection above, is that it may be difficult to manage 
corporate cultures directly, without making the therapy worse than the disease.65  
Hence, the most promising strategy is to think about other levers within the in-
stitutional framework of a society that have an indirect effect on how corporate 
cultural power functions. To be sure, these are not linear, Newtonian equations; 
rather, we are dealing with likelihoods and informed guesses. These, however, 
might be refined by empirical research and practical experiments.66 
A basic, but central point that I already alluded to concerns the general power 
differential between employers and employees. Although it is not implausible 
to think that even companies whose employees are free to leave will exert some 
corporate culture power over them, it is the general background of unequal power 
that makes the phenomenon so insidious in today’s societies. How one can reduce 
the power differentials between employers and employees is, of course, a con-
tested question, far beyond the scope of this paper. Various proposals have been 
recently brought forward in political philosophy, for example, an unconditional 
minimum income that facilitates exit, workplace republicanism, or workplace 
democracy.67  These would, in different ways, reduce the power relations that 
operate in the background of corporate cultural power. This means that an indirect 
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argument in their favor, based on the need to reduce the risks for autonomy from 
corporate cultural power, can be added to the other arguments brought forward 
for them.
Workplace republicanism and workshop democracy are also relevant for a 
second reason: they could help make the mechanisms of corporate cultural power 
more explicit, and thereby help individuals to relate to them in a more conscious, 
and hence more autonomous, way. This is particularly important for morally con-
troversial issues, about which individuals should be able to make a conscious 
choice, rather than being subdued by corporate cultural power and made com-
plicit in practices they would otherwise reject. In pluralist societies, it is more 
likely than not that the individuals who are colleagues in one corporation disagree 
on important moral questions. If such questions come up, individuals should not 
have to swallow the answers provided by their employers and transmitted through 
its culture, but rather be able to challenge them and to reflect on their own po-
sitions. As Blanc has convincingly argued, there are good reasons to give them 
more “moral space” once they have understood, for example, that certain projects 
conflict with their own values.68  But this understanding is the end point of a 
reflective process that needs to get off the ground in the first place. Open conver-
sation about moral conflicts need to be permitted, and there need to be genuine, 
and not just formal, opportunities for raising one’s voice.
One way of securing such opportunities are corporate governance structures 
that allow for counterpower, for example, industrial councils or employee rep-
resentation in company boards. In such governance structures, individuals have 
meaningful choices to make—an important precondition for developing and 
maintaining autonomy. In addition, corporations run in such ways, for example, 
with worker co-determination or as cooperatives, often have an interest in sup-
porting the autonomy of their members, because they in turn depend on them 
taking co-responsibility for their common endeavor. They might thus create cor-
porate cultures that are salutary for autonomy, such that individuals’ social rela-
tions at the workplace—and not only those in their private lives or other social 
realms—actually support their autonomy. Promoting such structures is thus also 
a policy that contributes to promoting autonomy-friendly cultural contexts for 
citizens overall.
A third strategy is to ensure that individuals have sufficient opportunities to 
leave the sphere of influence of corporate cultural power behind, so that they can 
critically reflect, with some distance, on what they experience at work and how 
their employer’s culture might shape their beliefs, preferences, and values. In 
other words, this means looking for possibilities of strengthening individuals’ au-
tonomy before they enter the workplace. The segmentation of one’s life into work 
and nonwork is sometimes described as dangerous because, at work, individuals 
may not feel bound by moral imperatives that they willingly accept in their pri-
vate lives.69  But the alternative, a close integration of “work” and “life,” does not 
necessarily come in the form of individuals carrying their moral convictions into 
their work place—it can also take the form of corporate cultural power pervading 
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not only individuals’ work lives, but also their private lives. Deal and Kennedy 
write that “Strong cultures create meaning for people. Through their rituals they 
teach people how to behave, not just in their corridors of power but in the world 
at large.”70  One would hope that in a free, democratic society, individuals are able 
to wander other corridors as well, in order to think critically about the “meaning” 
created by their corporate culture. The flexibilization of working time can allow 
individuals to better organize their lives according to their own preferences,71  but 
it can have problematic side-effects with regard to the cultural power, which can 
creep into more and more parts of their lives.
A number of countermeasures can be taken, however, to make this influence 
less pressing. One aspect is a simple issue of time: how many hours do people 
have to work (and how many hours do they have to think about their work in what 
is officially their spare time?), how many holidays can they take per year? Time 
not spent in the corporate environment is a form of temporary exit that at least 
offers a break from the messages sent by the corporate culture. While the distri-
bution of free time in society is a question of distributive justice in and of itself,72  
it also influences how resilient individuals are when companies try to influence 
them through corporate cultural power. Individuals should have a right to live a 
life beyond work, and one of the reasons for this is that in order to develop and 
maintain their autonomy, they need to be able to acquire critical distance from any 
single source of cultural influence they are exposed to, including corporate cul-
tural power.73  Even if—and maybe especially when—individuals self-select into 
a company with a culture that they by and large endorse, they also need to have 
opportunities to be confronted with other values, commitments, and cultures.74 
If such measures were in place, many of the most problematic aspects of 
corporate cultural power would be defused, because the power differential would 
be reduced. There might still be issues, however, about the match between indi-
viduals’ values and the cultural values of the corporations they work for. Ideally, 
one would want to see a broad array of corporate cultures (within the scope of 
what is morally legitimate), so that individuals have a meaningful choice between 
working for more communitarian, more individualistic, more tranquil or more 
fast-moving companies, and so on. For that to be possible, the labor market needs 
to be sufficiently flexible—a fourth strategy that can help to mitigate problems of 
mismatches. There should be no unnecessary obstacles, such as health insurance 
or pension payments that are tied to specific employers and not transferable, for 
individuals to switch between jobs, so that they can find employers whose culture 
corresponds to their own values, even when these change in the course of their 
lives. Also, companies should be explicit and honest about their culture, so that 
individuals can make informed decisions when looking for jobs.
This leads to a last point, namely the broader question of the sources of cul-
tural power in a society. Earlier, I had mentioned the obvious fact that individu-
als are exposed to various cultural influences, not just corporate cultural power. 
Various individuals and institutions attempt to influence the beliefs and values of 
individuals, including religious organizations, TV personalities, or fashion gurus. 
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In his list of normative organizations Amitai Etzioni includes labor unions, polit-
ical parties, and professional organizations.75  Why, one might ask, should these 
not be considered threats to individuals’ autonomy as well? Above, I have argued 
that the impact of corporate cultural power is more intense, in term of time, and 
often also more insidious, when cultural power is used for instrumental reasons. 
Most corporations simply do not exist in order to create and maintain a certain 
kind of culture, whereas this is indeed the case for certain other groups and insti-
tutions to which individuals turn when looking for meaning and guidance. While 
one might want to criticize some of the ways in which this happens, there is at 
least no problem of implicitness.
The positive effect of such other institutions is that they can help limit the 
influence of corporate cultural power on individuals’ autonomy, by diversifying 
the sets of beliefs, values, and preferences they are exposed to. In a society whose 
citizens are keen to safeguard their autonomy against the threats created by corpo-
rate cultural power, such institutions should be welcomed. It might even be said 
that it is preferable that they, rather than corporations, exercise cultural power. In 
the case of, say, religious organizations or social movements we assume that what 
motivates their leaders to influence their followers’ beliefs and values is that they 
actually believe in them, and we may become very skeptical if we realize that 
they also benefit financially.
In order to develop and maintain their autonomy, individuals need to be able 
to familiarize themselves with, and compare, different worldviews and sets of 
principles, and they need time to think about them critically, together with others 
or in an inner dialogue of the kind Arendt describes. If their lives are more and 
more engulfed by the corporate cultural power of their employers—or of other 
companies they interact with—these preconditions of autonomy become precar-
ious. It is far preferable to live in a society in which there are multiple sources 
of cultural influence, both corporate and otherwise, and in which individuals can 
have meaningful choice between them. Not least, this provides a buffer against 
too much cultural power by the state—a point that has often been emphasized by 
liberal thinkers, while similarly dangerous cultural influences coming from the 
private sector have often been overlooked.76 
I have argued, above, that such a concern with citizens’ autonomy is not 
perfectionist in any problematic way. In fact, one might venture the guess that by 
taking steps to reduce corporate cultural power and strengthening autonomy, the 
citizens of democratic countries would be doing nothing but addressing a prison-
ers’ dilemma. The current situation, with its lack of attention to corporate cultural 
power, looks very much like a collective action problem: employees as a group 
seem unable to coordinate their behavior, to counterbalance the pressures put on 
them by employers. Hence, everyone might be better off in a system in which 
there are stronger safeguards for autonomy.
However, one might also read such safeguards in a stronger way: as protect-
ing the conditions of the possibility of a democratic society. For if individuals are 
unable to guard their capacity for autonomous reflection, it is not clear whether 
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the idea and practice of democracy continue to be meaningful. Even if efficiency 
and economic output might be reduced as a result of measures that protect auton-
omy—which is an empirical question, and the answer is not at all straightforward, 
given that countries vary vastly both with regard to productivity per hour and with 
regard to average annual working hours, and so on—this is a price worth paying 
for protecting one of the basic tenets of a democratic system.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that corporate cultural power can threaten citi-
zens’ autonomy, and that citizens in democratic countries have good reasons take 
steps to protect themselves against this threat. As my brief discussion of concrete 
proposals has made clear, some such measures could also be taken under today’s 
nonideal circumstances. Many of them concur with institutional proposals that 
we can also endorse for other reasons, for example, the reduction of depend-
ence. Pointing out the interrelations of such proposals with questions of corporate 
cultural power helps us see additional reasons for why they are valuable—why, 
for example, a fair distribution of sufficient amounts of free time in a society is 
important, or why it matters to reduce the imbalance of power between employers 
and employees. Thus, taking corporate cultural power seriously, and considering 
it from a perspective of autonomy, is also a way of bringing business ethics and 
political philosophy closer together.
Today, it is very unclear what the future of work will be: some claim that 
robots will take up many tasks traditionally performed by human beings, oth-
ers argue that information technologies will break up “the firm” as we know it. 
Already today, some internet firms have only a tiny number of staff and small 
amounts of capital, but, thanks to scaling effects, serve millions of customers 
around the world.77  For such business models, questions of corporate cultural 
power arise not only for employees, but also for various kinds of “users.” It seems 
fair to say that the power of these corporations is, in many respects, too large; 
when thinking about how to curtail it, their cultural power should also be taken 
into account. The members of democratic societies should not have their beliefs, 
commitments, preferences, and in the final analysis also their political agendas 
set by corporate agents. If we continue to believe in the autonomy of individuals, 
as a value in itself and as one of the key preconditions of democracy, the threat to 
autonomy posed by corporations needs to be a shared concern.
To be sure, this discussion would be easier if corporate cultural power were 
a less elusive phenomenon. It would be extremely helpful if one could draw on 
more empirical research: for example, on measurements of the impact of cor-
porate cultural power, or on cross-cultural comparisons of the susceptibility to 
corporate cultural power, which is likely to be connected to different attitudes 
to life and work and the roles in different countries. It would be fascinating to 
compare the impact of corporate cultural power under different types of corporate 
governance regimes or within different industries. This would allow us to come 
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up with more concrete proposals, backed up by evidence about what works and 
what doesn’t. But the lack of empirical evidence should not be a reason to neglect 
this topic—on the contrary. A phenomenon that threatens individuals’ autonomy 
threatens the very core of what democracy is about, and so we cannot afford to 
overlook it.
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idea that to shape behavior, you have to shape the premises of decision making” (1986, 127). 
Perrow argues that “these premises are to be found in the ‘vocabulary’ of the organization, the 
structure of communication, rules and regulations and standard programs, selection criteria for 
personnel, and so on—in short, in the structural aspects” (128). This notion is in one sense nar-
rower than my notion of cultural power because it focuses exclusively on what happens within 
organizations; cultural power, in contrast, can radiate beyond the boundaries of organizations. 
On the other hand, “premis control” is a broader notion, because the premises of decision making 
also contain other kinds of power, for example, rewards or punishments.
38Hallett (2003, 132).
39See, for example, Etzioni (1961, 145); Ouchi (1980, 132).
40Peters and Waterman (1982); see similarly McCoy (1985).
41Peters and Waterman (1982, 26).
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42Ibid., 78ff.
43Deal and Kennedy (1982).
44Peters and Waterman (1982, 75).






51See similarly Blanc (2014); Néron (2015); Anderson (2017).
52See Hiley (2018). For a general discussion of relevance of Michel Foucault’s work for business 
ethics, see also Crane, Knights, and Starkey (2008).
53As research by Alexander Hertel-Fernandez (2016) shows, this practice of “employer mobilization” 
is far more widespread in the United States than one might assume; messages are often sent in 
conjunction with warnings about the fate of the company or of individuals’ jobs if the “wrong” 
candidate wins an election.
54Kunda (1996, chap. 5).
55Kunda (1996, 224–26). This problem may be particularly acute for individuals who hope to climb 
the corporate ladder. One might therefore downplay it as a luxury problem mostly relevant for 
careerists, but one should not forget that climbing corporate ladders is an important mechanism 
of social mobility. It seems problematic to expect those who want to be socially mobile to carry 
the extra burden of dealing with “culture traps”—and it is by no means clear that they are really 
the only ones who have to do so.
56A related objection, with different normative implications, is to hold that managers are not responsi-
ble for organizational cultures, because these are influenced by broader trends, for example man-
agement fads that wash over whole industries (see, e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). If, or insofar as, this is the case, it means that the buck does not stop at managers, 
but rather at those—for example, business school professors or consultants—who start such fads. 
But it does not reduce the normative weight of the phenomenon.
57In the rest of this paper, I mostly speak of management as the addressee of normative claims, but this 
should be understood as pars pro toto for everyone who can influence corporate culture.
58In a recent paper, Jooho Lee (2018) holds that corporations, understood along the lines of the “hi-
erarchies” model, are a general threat to autonomy, because individuals give up control over the 
ends that they will set for themselves in the future. This argument is different from my argument 
about corporate cultural power because it mainly refers to explicit forms of power: orders given 
by bosses. From Lee’s perspective, understanding corporations along the lines of the “nexus of 
contracts” literature remains an option that is compatible with employees’ autonomy. The practi-
cal question that flows from this argument is: what would make sure that corporations function as 
sets of contracts rather than as problematic “hierarchies”? The considerations one could adduce 
in response partly overlap with the ones that I discuss, below, as means for reducing corporate 
cultural power.
59Silver and Geller (1978, 135).
60See, for example, Bandura (1999).
61The arguments in this section leave open the possibility that cultural influences in other spheres 
might also pose problematic threats to individuals’ autonomy, as mentioned earlier.
62Gheaus and Herzog (2016).
63If the members of an organization created a culture that undermined their own autonomy, this might 
raise questions about legitimate paternalist interventions. For reasons of space, and because such 
a scenario does not seem very likely, I here skip this question.
64It goes without saying that corporate cultures should also avoid condoning other morally prob-
lematic practices, for example, corruption. As a study by Jamie-Lee Campbell and Anja Göritz 
shows, corrupt organizations are pervaded by narratives and assumption, for example, that they 
are “fighting a war” and that “the end justifies the mean” (2013). Instead, they should create a cor-
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porate culture that is conducive to moral behavior, for example, by raising awareness of morally 
salient issues in global supply chains. Empirical research on “ethical climate” (Victor and Cullen 
1987; 1988) and “ethical culture” (Treviño 2015, 2017), operationalized as survey items, has 
explored their relations to other variables, for example, whether or not individuals would engage 
in questionable selling practices (Barnett and Vaicys 2000). Such moral climates are assumed 
to have a moderating effect on individual behavior (ibid., 360). See also Douglas, Davidson, 
and Schwartz (2001) on support for an indirect relation between ethical judgments and ethical 
culture. William Wines and J. B. Hamilton (2009) explore how “new stories” can contribute to 
cultural change for the better).
65This does not mean that there could not be direct regulation that bans extreme forms of corporate 
cultural power, for example, techniques of manipulation.
66In what follows, I focus on steps that have a fairly direct influence on the impact of corporate cul-
tural power. In addition, democratic states can take general steps to strengthen their citizens’ 
autonomy, as briefly described above—these include steps like offering general education that 
strengthens people’s ability to reflect about their choices, or making sure that individuals have 
meaningful options of shifting to different careers. It should also be noted that all my consider-
ations are pro tanto considerations.
67On an unconditional basic income, see for example, Widerquist (2013). On workplace republican-
ism see Hsieh (2005). On workplace democracy see especially the recent account by Ferreras 
(2017). For an overview of the recent debate see Frega, Herzog, and Neuhäuser (2019). In the 
debate about workplace democracy, one often finds a link between autonomy, meaningful work, 
and democracy (especially in Rössler 1998 and Yeoman 1995). But none of these authors has 
made an argument based on considerations about corporate culture, to the best of my knowledge.
68Blanc (2014).
69For example, Jackall (2012).
70Deal and Kennedy (1982, 83).
71Blanc (2014, 485).
72For example, Goodin (2010); Rose (2014; 2016).
73Cf. also Néron on separation between workplace and private life (2015, 115).
74Does this limit the autonomy of others who prefer a life with longer working hours (as in “truly pre-
fer,” not as in “prefer because the hourly wage is so low that this is the only way to reach a decent 
standard of living")? In the best of all possible worlds, every individual could choose to work 
exactly the amount of hours they prefer, but for practical reasons (mostly because of competitive 
dynamics), regulation might nonetheless be needed. In such a case, there might also be some 
losses in terms of autonomy, but these might be outweighed by gains. One might also raise ques-
tions about paternalism: might it be legitimate to prevent individuals from harming themselves 
through their own choices? For reasons of space, I cannot here go into a detailed discussion, but 
it seems to me that the protection of individuals’ autonomy can in fact justify certain paternalistic 
measures, as long as careful measures against abuse are taken.
75Etzioni (1961, 40ff).
76A thoughtful discussion that emphasizes both the threats to freedom from the state and from inter-
mediary groups and organizations—although explicitly excluding economic organizations—can 
be found in Levy (2015).
77See for example, Davis (2015) or Kelly (2016), on “platforms” as a principle of corporate organi-
zation.
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